Pada-Vrtti
Pada-Vrtti
Śābdabodha is considered as a distinct pramā (valid cognition), which is a product, produced by modus operandi, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeşika school of Indian philosophy. The term is explained as “śabdajanyah śābdah. śābdaś cāsau bodhaś ca śābdabodhah. I.e., knowledge, generated by śabda is called śābdabodha. Śābdobodha is often rendered in English as ‘verbal cognition’, ‘sentential cognition’ or ‘linguistic understanding’. The word śabda in present context does not mean a ‘word’, but it has a technical meaning viz. ‘a true proposition’ or a ‘ sentence’. The tradition defines ‘śabda as ‘āptavākyam śabdah (i.e., the sentence of a trustworthy speaker, whose words can be verified with facts is called śabda). The modus operandi that yields the śābdabodha is:
(i) Cognition of pada 5 (meaningful phonetic unit or grammatical elements like prātipadika. Dhatu. Pratyaya, etc.) which is treated as the most effieient causal factor (karana) to yield śābdabodha.
(ii) Recollection of the word meaning (padārtha = referent or import of the word) which is treated as a function (vyāpāra) in producing a śābdabodha.
(iii) The cognition of the relation between pada and padārtha known as sakti or vŗtti is considered to be the auxiliary cause (sahakāri-kāraņa) of śābdabodha.
It is proposed to focus only on the third point in this paper. Though according to the causal operation or the modus operandi of the śābdabodha, the vŗtti-jñāna (cognition of the signifying potency of the word ) is considered as the auxiliary cause, it is as important as the primary cause (karaņa) itself’. Because, without vŗtti-jñāna, no word-meaning would be cognized and if no word-meaning is cognized, no śābdabodha. The result of the causal operation would be available. Therefore, the role of the signifying potency (vŗtti śakti) is of high value, which deservesss serious attention. Before we examine the role of the signifying potency (vŗtti) , we need to reflect on the nature of pada and padārtha, which in turn would pave the way in contemplating on the ‘relation’ between them, which is called vŗtti in the śāstras.
What is Pada?
Pada is translated in English as ‘word’. ‘Word’, as generally we understand is ‘a sound or group of sounds that expresses ‘a meaning’ The pada in the period of Navya-Nyāya, has been defined as ‘śaktam ’7 (the phonetic unit that has expressive potency or signifying power is called a pada), ignoring the pada-theory in the older schools of Nyāya and Vyākarana, which was based on the syntactic notion. Panini, the greatest of all in the field of Grammar has defined pada as ‘suptinantam padam’ 8 i.e.,‘word’ that ends in inflection: (declensional and conjugational )suffixes. Gotama, the founder of Nyāya school of thought has just reinterated the views of Pāņini in his Nyāya aphorisms : ‘te. Vibhaktyantāh padam’ 9 i.e., those (letters)ending in inflectional suffixes are called pada. The same view has been shared by many other prominent scholars of Prācīna-Nyāya (Old school of Nyāya)10 As far as the language oriented issues are concerned, though the pre-Gańgeśa thinkers were in agreement with their counterparts in the schools of Pāņinian grammar, the post-Gangesa thinkers radically differ from them taking the cognitive approach to the linguistic communication. This is completely a new dimension to the linguistic analysis.
Pada-Vŗtti : The Funcitonal Relation
By now, it is clear that the vŗtti is the relation between the pada (word) and padārtha (word-meaning). Broadly speaking there are three types of relations possible in the context of śābdabodha. They are (a) ‘objective 14 relation’ (b) ‘functional relation’ (c) ‘cognitive relation’. Simply speaking the relation that exists between two or many ‘objects’ in the empirical world is called ‘objective relation’. There are only two types of primary ‘objective relations’ generally accepted in Nyāya-Varśeşika, and they are samyoga (contact) and samavāya (inherence) 15 Any relation that functions as relation between the cognitive event and the causal instrument or the means of cognition and the instance of cognition may be called ‘functional relation’. For instance, in the causation of perceptual cognition of ghaţa (the object) by the help of ‘eye’ (the instrument) the samyoga (contact) functions as relation. In the same manner for the perceptual cognition of śabda (the object) by the help of ‘ear’ (the instrument) samavāya function as relations and thus that is called ‘functional relation’. Similarly when we understand a ‘word-meaning’ on hearing a word, shakti inherent in the word is the functional relation, in producing the understanding.
On Pada Vŗtti
The term vŗtti generally means :lying’, as found in the usage, ‘the idea lies in the mind’. In sanskrit language, we have the usage ‘Idam padam asmin arthe vartate’ – ‘This word lies in this sense’. This, when put in English idiom, means ‘This word is used in this sense’. Here the word can lie in a sense through a relation. This relation is called ‘vritti’. (†ÖêÖ ÃÖ´²Ö¬ÖêÖ ¾ÖŸÖÔŸÖê ‡×ŸÖ ¾Öé×¢Ö„ ÃÖ´²Ö¬Ö„) . This ‘vritti’ is considered as the signifying property of words.
The Power Ignition:
The words, according to ancient seers have the ‘power of ignition’ (abhijvalana) that causes the understanding. This power of ‘ignition’ is treated as the ‘function’ between word and meaning. We see a mantra quoted in Mahābhāşya 19 that says:
“yad adhītam avijñātam nigadenaiva śabdyate |
anagnāviva śuşkaidho na taj-jvalati karhicid” ||
This mantra may be translated as: ‘Whatsoever has been studied, not understood (and) that has been merely mechanically uttered. That does not as in the case of dry fuel in absense.
Commenting upon this mantra Bhaţţoji Dīksita says in his Śabdakaustubha’ “na jvalati na prakāśate”. In other words, the words have ‘illuminating’ power that helps to make something clear. This theory of ‘illuminating power of words’ is seriously considered by early Mīmāmsakas. Kumārila Bhaţţa, the author of Śloka-Vārttika gives the example of ‘ignition of fuel as in cooking;’ for the revelation of word-meaning by the words20. Helarāja commenting upon the first kārikā of Sambandha-samuddeśa says: “prayogeņa abhijvalitaih śabdaiah tritayam avagamyate-ātmīyam rūpam. Arthaś ca phalasādhanah prāyoktur abhiprāyaśca”. It means –Three things are understood by the words/sentences through the communicative ignition (a) the self form of the words, (b) the meaning, that yields the final result. (c) the intention of the speaker. Here the ‘power of ignition’ is emphasized apart from giving the three modules of ‘meaning’.
It is obvious that Helārāja borrows the view of Bhrtŗhari who envisaged the three modules as per the following three different views regarding the śabda’21.
1) The first refers to the phonetic form of a word that is uttered, which has a sequence. (yo vāyam uccāryate kramavān avarah).
2) The second refers to the word-form in ones own knowledge-structure, which is sequence-less, and the word-form in its pure essence. From this śabda we understand meaning. (kaścid anyah akramah śabdātmā buddhistho vigāhate tasmāt artha-pratipattih).
3) The third is said to have two powers of which one reveals itself and the other reveals the thing-meant. (dviśaktih śabda ātma-prakāśane ‘rtha-prakasane ca samarthah).
Out of these three forms of śabda, the second form of śabda conveys the meaning in a speaker-listener situation”22.
The Relation between the Word and Meaning:
There are two ways of looking at the relations between words and their meanings:
(i) ‘What type of relation exists between the word and its meaning’?
(ii) ‘How many types of relations are possible between the word and its meaning’?
The first question refers to specifically ‘whether the ‘relation’ is temporal or eternal’ and the second refers to different types of relations like śkati, lakşņā, vyñjanā, abheda, vācya-vācakabhāva. Pratyāyya-pratyāyakabhāva so on and so forth. To answer the first question the ancient Indian traditional scholarship is vertically divided into two groups. one group holds the view that the ‘relation’ between śabda and artha is temporal, because both of them are temporal. The other group holds the opposite view that it is eternal because both of them are eternal. It is of course not necessary to assume that any ‘relation’ between two eternal entities would essentially eternal 23.
The Mīmāmsakas on Word-Meaning-Relationship:
The Mīmāmsakas and the grammarians hold the identical view that the word-meaning-relationship is eternal (nitya), though they differ on their reasoning. The Mīmāmsakas argue in favour of the ‘natural relationship’ of words with their respective meaning 23. According to them, the innate ability of a child helps him in grasping the word-meaning through the observation of the instruction and action of the elders. Bhartŗhari terms this ‘innate ability’ as yogyata25, which in turn justifies the natural relationship of words with the meanings. This view is proposed and strongly advocated against the ‘conventional theory’ (sāmayika – siddhānta) of the Naiyāyikas. It may further be noted that these are the two major theories viz. natural and conventional kept that the traditional scholars in ancient time engaged in dialogue for quite sometime .
Multitude of Relationships between Word and Meaning:
The multitude of relationship taken into consideration to answer the second question certainly makes one perplexed in connection with the word meaning relationship. They are:
(i) Samślesa (Close-Contact), Samyoga (Contact)26
(ii) Tādātmya (Identity), Aikya (Unity)
(iii) Samavāya (Inherence)27
(iv) Kārya-kāraņa-bhava (The State of being cause and effect)28
(v) Nimitta-naimittika-bhāva (The state of being efficient cause and product)
(vi) Yauna (Affinity)
(vii) Āśrayāśrayibhāva (The state of being substrata and superstrata)29
(viii) Pratyāyya-pratyāyaka-bhāva or Bodhya-bodhaka-bhāva (The state of causing to know and known)
(ix) Vācya-vācaka-bhāva (The state of being denotator and denotated relation)
These are the various possible relations just listed by Gosvāmī Puruşottama in his Prasthānaratnākara. It is interesting to note that all these ‘relations’ are found mentioned directly or indirectly by Bhartŗhari in the Sambandha-samuddeśa, in Padakānda of Vākyapadīya. It would be quite interesting to investigate the origin and development of these relations between śabda and artha and their contribution to language philosophy. I am afraid that it would not be possible to go into the details of all these word-meaning relations here because of want of space and time.
Tādātmya : The Relation between śabda dn artha:
We need to pay attention to the second relation namely ‘identity’ (tādātmya) out of these different possible relations. Identity is advocated and accepted by grammarians as a viable relation between śabda and artha. The Naiyāyikas explain tādātmya as abheda 30 (complete identity) and argue that if the śabda and artha are taken to be completely identical, in that case, whenever someone utters the word ‘sweet’ or ‘rasagolā he would have to feel ‘sweetness’ in his mouth. In the same manner, if he utters the word ‘blade’ his tongue would have to cut /split into parts31. The other possible interpretation of tādātmyam is aikyam’32 (unity) that essentially means the same thing as above namely ‘complete identity’. However, the Naiyāyikas do not agree with the grammarians on the ‘identity theory’ because, pragmatically speaking the ‘difference’ of śabda and artha is understood by one’s own experience. And no one can deny the truth of his/her ‘experience’. Therefore, the identity theory does not stand to the test of the communicative as well as the cognitive approach of language, opine the Naiyāyikas.
However, the grammarians are well aware of these problems, and still they stick to their stand. The views of the grammarians, as stated above, have to be seen from two different levels: (a) surface level and (b) deep level. In the surface level the śabda means to them ‘a sentence’ or ‘a word’ and artha means ‘meaning’ in which case the relation of Tadatrya, between them is ‘vācya-vācaka-bhāva’33 (the state of being denoted sense and the ‘denotator). In the deep level ‘śabda’refers to its essential/transcendental form (śabda-tattva) according to grammarians, and the whole universe is its vivartta (an apparent/illusory form). just like the ‘ocean’ and the ‘waves’ in it. In that sense they are not different from that. Therefore, they are identical.
The Adhyāsa Theory of Identity:
Yoga system of Indian philosophy advocate the Adhyāsa theory of word, meaning and the cognitive state. Referring to the commentary Bhāsvatī on Yogasūtra (III.17)34, J.N. Mohanti remarks (and I quote)
“Owing to mutual superimposition, word, object and cognition get mixed up, so that the word which designates appears to be the same as its meaning, and that again appears to be the same as cognition: thus their seeming identity. By distinguishing between them, and by controlling each separately one comes to know the truth of all things, i.e., one knows what is the object designated by all the words that are uttered”35.
After saying that the three-word, object and cognition- are different, the commentary goes on:
Sign is of the nature of that remembrance which consists in mutual superimposition of word and its object. In other words, what is sound (or the denoting word) is the same as the object, what is object is the same as word. one who knows their distinction i.e., is capable of separating them and fixing his mind on each separately, is all-knowing, i.e., can know all those objects which are signified by all uttered words.
What, however, is needed is to go back behind this seeming identification and to isolate the different components- the act of uttering, the act of meaning, and the experience of the object out there – that have entered into this peculiar synthesis of unification, so that the object, a table, for example, seems to be clothed with the word ‘table’ and experience seems to be linguistic.
The grammarians therefore, interpret the term tādātmya not in the sense of ‘complete identiy’ but ‘identity in difference’. Nāgeśa defining tādātmyam in his Vaiyākaraņa-Siddhānta-Laghu-Mañjūşā (VSLM) says “tādātmyam ca tadbhinnatve sati tadabhedena pratīyamānatvam/abhedasyādhyastatvāc ca na tayor virodhah”36. Here he takes resort to the theory of adhyāsa between the śabda and artha and thereby he says there would not arise any such problem that otherwise arises in the theory of ‘complete identity’. He argues that if the śabda and artha were totally different from each other then it would be difficult even to relate them for communication through speech (vyavahāra)37. on the contrary, our speech behaviour proves that the śabda and artha have identity in difference that established the tādātmya-sambandha as defined above. He gives the example of ‘a cow’ the word, and ‘the cow’ the meaning are coherent in our speech behaviour as: “ayam sāsnādimān artho gaur ityarthako ‘ayam gaur iti”38. This leads to conclude that the relation between śabda and artha is tādātmya. There are several other arguments grammarians propose in establishing the tādātmya relation between śabda and artha like the one, the theory of ‘bauddha-padārtha’39 etc., which we need not go into detail here.
THE COGNITIV E APPROACH TO PADA-PADĀRTHA-SAMBANDHA :
The cognitive approach to Pada-Padārtha-Sambandha, the functional relationship, when grasped, is technically called śakti-graha. The Naiyāyikas accept two-fold nature of śakti :
(i) Īśvarecchā-rūpā i.e., in the form of ‘God’s desire’, and
· Pātribhāsiki i.e., conventional 42. The first one is eternal (nitya) and the second is temporal (anitya).
The God involvement in this case is required even for the Naiyāyikas because of the problem of vinigamanā-viraha that leads to uncertainty. This is elaborately discussed by Gadādhara in his Śaktivāda, a treatise on the Pada-Padārtha-Sambandha or the functional relation between the word and their meanings.
Conclusion:
The functional relation of śābdabodha or the relation between the word and the meaning, as we have seen above, is the major focal point of intellectual tradition in India since the Vedic period. Highly idealistic approach to the language as has been argued by Bhartŗhari and his followers though is highly appreciated even in modern period notwithstanding to the criticism of ‘mysticism’ to the language philosophy, the communication aspect is never ignored even in Bhartŗhari’s system. There are clearly two dimensions to the communication aspect of language (a) the cognitive approach and (b) the expressive approach. The former leads to the śābdabodha and the latter leads to the lexical classification of words. The lexical classification of words not only includes the two fold, three fold or four fold meanings like śakyārtha, laksyārtha, vyańgyartha or tatparyārtha etc. it also includes the classification of words like yaugika, rūdha, yogarūdha and yaugikarūdha etc. The lexical classification refers to the ‘primary signification power’ and ‘secondary signification power’ of words, which leads to the theory of preferentiality of the meaning of one over the other. The cognitive approach however emphasizes on the communicability aspect of language, which is the sole purpose of speech behavior . The advancement of the theory is seen in explicating the cognitive structure of linguistic understanding, which further expanded into the meaning assignment exercise to the linguistic elements. The other related dimension to the cognitive approach is the cause-effect-relationship of the cognitive episode and the causal mechanism of linguistic understanding. This cause effect relationship further entangled with the bādhya-bādhaka-bhāva types of logical problems leading to conceive the concepts like śakyatāvacchedaka, śaktatāvacchedaka, kāryatāvacchedaka, kāraņatāvacchedaka etc. giving a completely new picture or flavor of linguistic analysis. This appears to be very complicated, and complicated indeed, in an intention to achieve clarity and in-ambiguity. It may be pointed out here that though these two approaches namely cognitive as well as expressive appeared to be two radically different approaches are the two sides of the same coin and each is supplementary and complementary to the other. These two approaches are not adversaries to one another as it appears in some of the śāstric dialogues.
NOTES AND REFERENCE:
1. See Daya Krishna, 2002. “Sign, Sense and Reference: Reflections on the Problems in the Philosophy of Language”. JICPR Vol.XIX, Number 2, pp.129-138.
2. Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary defines Modus Vivendi a Latin word ‘A practical arrangement by which people who are quarrelling can continue to love or work together while waiting for their dispute to be settled’.
3. In the same way Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary defines Modus Operandi, yet again a Latin word as ‘A particular method of working or dealing with a task’
4. TS.p.50
5. There are two prominent views on the nature of pada. According to Pāņinian school of grammar the inflected/grammatically finished word is called pada. Pāņini defines pada as sup-tinantam padam. This view is shared by the old school of Nyāya as well Gotama, the author of Nyāya-Sūtra also defines pada as te vibhaktyamtāh padam.
6. Cf. “sahakāri’samavadhāne sati phalopadhānatvam bhavati kāranasya” Comm.ATV.
7. TS-66.
8. P.1.4.14.
9. NS.2.2.58
10. Vātsyāyana in his Nyāya Bhāsya accepts the communication approach to the definition of pada. He says ‘padena artha-sampratyaya iti prayojanam’. Vacaspati Misra in his Nyāya Vārttika Tātparya-tīkāsays ‘asti hi bhinnesv api varņesu vākyam idam, ekam padam iti va sārvajanīno nubhavah.” He however goes to argue that the pada is not different from the varņas, not at all in the nature of sphoţa that has been presented by Grammarians.
11. The sphoţa theory is the most significant doctrine presented by the grammarians on the nature of verbal knowledge in the traditional school of grammar. I do not want to go into the details on the sphota theory here. It is beyond the scope of this paper. However it is worth mentioning by the name only and the details on this issue may be seen in the following monographs.
(I) Joshi, S.D. 1967, The Sphoţa Nirņaya of Kauņdabhaţţa, ed with translation and notes, PCASS, University of Poona,
(II) Coward Haroldg., 1980, sphoţa Theory of Languages, Motilal Banarasidas. Delhi.
12. See Nyāya-Bhāsya on NS 1.1.3
13. See VSLM p.5-6
Bhartrhari has proposed the view in details in his Vākyapadīya. Let us look at this famous kārikā:
pade na varnā vidyante varņeşvavayavā na ca
vākyāt padānām atyantam praviveko na kascanal||
V.P.I. 73, also cf.2.10
‘There are no phonemes in the word nor are their parts in the phoneme. There is no absolute difference of the words from the sentence. See Tr. And notes K.A.S Iyer.DCPRI, Poona. 1965.
14. Objective is present context should no be taken in contrast to ‘subjective’. However, ‘objective’ as has been defined in Oxford Dictionary is that ‘having existence outside the mind: that can be observed and proved: real.
15. cf. “dvividhah sambandhah samyogah samavāyas ca” TB.P.28
16. See details on the issues in my paper : Dash.A.1999. “Śābdabodha. Cognitive Priorities and the Odd Stories of Samsargatāvāda and Prakāratāvāda”. Journal of Indian Philosophy. Dordrech.
17. Pāņini uses the term vŗtti twice in his aphorisms. one (P.1.3.38) in the sense of absence of obstruction or intervention (aprathibandha) and the second (P.4.1.42) in the sense of ‘profession or occupation’ (jīvanopāya as per the etymology ‘vartate’ nayā iti vŗttir jīvikā). The second meaning is a popular meaning of the term. Which has ben used by many authors in Sanskrit literature like Kālidāsa in his Raghuvamsa 1.8 (vārdhakye muni-vrtinām). Pāņini accords the same meaning in his Aşţādhyāyī. But he never used the term in the sense of ‘occurrence of meaning in word’
18. Yaska’s Nirukta, “tatra vŗttim vartayanti”………….
19. Mbh. Paspaśāhnika
20. “Pāke jvāleva kāşţhānām padārtha-pratipādanam” Slokavārttika, Ka.343
21. See details on this issue: Vyākaraņa Mahābhāşya of Patanjali. Paspasahnika (1986). Joshi. S.D. and Roodbergen. J.A.F University of Poona.pp.18-23
22. Professor S.D. Joshi and Roodbergen concluding the debate on this issue remark:
“The first view quoted by the MDB says that the speech sounds uttered come in a sequence which is called avara-śabda. They produce a buddhistha śabda in the listener, which is itself without sequence and on the basis of which meaning is understood. Thus here between the utterance of the word by the speaker and the understanding of meaning by the listener an intermediate stage is introduced.
The second view says that the speech-sounds produced by the speaker reveal or manifest type-phonemes to the listener, in which abstraction is made of individual variations of pronunciation. on the basis of these type-phonemes, which are called sphoţa, and which are revealed in succession, meaning is understood. Here also, between the utterance of the sounds and the understanding of meaning an intermediate stage. Namely, the varna-jati-sphota, is introduced. Joshi, S.D. and Roodbergen. J.A.F. Paspasahnika, (1986), op cit.pp.22.
23. For instance, the contact (samyoga) between two atoms (paramānus) is obviously non-permanent.
24. “antpattikas tu śabdasya arthena sambandhah” MS.1.1.5.
25. “indriyāņam svavişayeşv anadir yogyatāyatha anādir arthaih śabdānām sambandho yogyatā tathā // VP.III.3.29.
26. Cf. “taddharmaņos tu tācchabdyam samyoga-samavāyayoh tayor apy upakārārthā niyatās tadupādhayah” VP III 3.6. See also VP III.3.7
27. Samavāya in present context possibly does not refer to the ‘samavāya’ in the schools of Nyāya-Vaiśeşika philosophy. Which is one of the seven categories (sapta-padārtha) and which is a relation between two ayutasiddha-padarthas. Bhartrhari mentions’samyoga’ and ‘samavaya’ in his Vakyapadiya as possible relation between śabda and artha. However, this view is not his final view. (See VP.III.3.10.19). Gosvami Purusottama refers to the relation ‘samavaya’ as a coterminous of tadatmya (PR p.39: “samavāyas ca tādātmyasyaiva nāmāntaram”) and he refutes the theories of Vaiśeşikas. The question in this context may be raised that if Gosvāmīji is serious about this stand then why did he mention samavāya dn radatmya both together with regard to possible relations between śabda and artha in present context. Is he inconsistent about his own theories? Or in present context, he just wants to translate different proposals from Vākyapadīya of Bhartŗhari?
28. This refers to the possible relation viz. kārya-kāraņa-bhāva between śabda and artha: which are known as banddha-sabda and banddha-artha as has been mentioned in Vākyapadīya : “śabdah kāraņam arthasya sa hi tenopajanyate tatha ca buddhivisayad arthāc chabdah pratīyate” Vp.III.3.32 and also VP III.3.33
29. See VP.III.3.43.
30. “abhedas tādātmyam” Vyutpattivāda by Gadādhara Bhattācārya, (VV) (with Jaya Comm.).p.60
31. “ksuramodakaśabdādyuccāraņe mukha-pātana-pvraņādyāpatteh” PR op cit p.14
32. Cf. “pare tu nirūpakabhede pi tādātmyam ekam eveti śaktyaikyam evety āhuh” Vaiyākaraņa Siddhānta Lghu Mañjuşā(VSLM) by Nāgeśa Bhaţţa, (Pt.I)(With Comm. Kalā & Kuñjikā) p.56)
33. Cf. “asyātam vācako vācya iti saşţhya pratīyate” VP.III3.3. 14-16. See also Śābdatarangiņī (ST) by Pt. V.Subramanya Shastri. The Sanskrit Education Society, Mylapore, Madras, 1969. P. 64-65
34. “śabdārthapratyayanam itaretaradhyasat samkaras tatpravibhāga-samyamāt sarvabhūtarutajñānam” YS.III.17.
35. Cf. “śabdarthapratyayānām itaretarādhyāsāt samkarah yo vācakah śabdah sa evārthah tad eva ca jñānam iti samkīrnatā. Tatpravibhāgasamyamāt pratyekam vibhajya samyamāt sarvabhūtānām rutajñānam uccarita-śabdārthajñanambhaved iti sutrarthah” Bhasvati on Yogasūtra. See J.N. Mohanty, 1992, p.63.
36. VSLM. Op cit. (Pt.I), p.40 PR also defines tādātmya as: “tādātmyañ ca bhedasahisnur abheda eva” p.41
37. Cf. “atyantabhede svapurusayor iva tadvyavahārabhāvāt VSLM op cit (Pt.I).p.40
38. VSLM op cit. (Pt.I) p.41
39. Cf. “vastuto bauddha evārthah śakyah padam api bauddham tayor abhedah” VSLM. Op cit. (Pt.I) p.45 Cf. ST op cit. p.69
40. “śabdārthayoh pratyāyya-pratyāyakabhāvah sambandhah pūrvam uktas tatra pratāayyatvam arthagatam, pratyayakatvam sabdagatam pratipadakatvaparaparyayam” PR op cit. p.101-102
41. PR.op cit.p.54
42. Cf. “samketo dvividhah ādhunikah nityas ceti ādhunikasamketah paribhāsā nityah īsvarasamketah śaktih” ST op cit.p. 76.
Department of Sanskrit,
Dr. H.S. Gour University,
Sagar-470 003.
M.P.
The Brahman and the Word Principle (Śabda)
- First online:
- 01 April 2009
DOI: 10.1007/s10781-009-9065-0
- Cite this article as:
- Timalsina, S. J Indian Philos (2009) 37: 189. doi:10.1007/s10781-009-9065-0
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Abstract
The literature of Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana attention in contemporary times. The writings of the prominent linguistic philosopher and grammarian Bhartṛhari and of Manḍana, an encyclopedic scholar of later seventh century and most likely a senior contemporary of Śaṅkara, shape Indian philosophical thinking to a great extent. on this premise, this study of the influence of Bhartṛhari on Maṇḍana’s literature, the scope of this essay, allows us to explore the significance of Bhartṛhari’s writings, not only to comprehend the philosophy of language, but also to understand the contribution of linguistic philosophy in shaping Advaita philosophy in subsequent times. This comparison is not to question originality on the part of Maṇḍana, but rather to explore the interrelationship between linguistic philosophy and the monistic philosophy of the Upaniṣadic tradition. Besides excavating the role of Bhartṛhari writings on the texts of Maṇḍana, analysis this will reveal the interrelatedness of the Advaita school of Śaṅkara often addressed as ‘pure non-dualism’ (Kevalādvaita) and the Advaita of Bhartṛhari, identified as ‘non-dualism of the word-principle’ (Śabdādvaita).